We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several ptopeities of the sets of feasible payo^s and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the X-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor. 0. IntrodiK^ioii. We consider iV-person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We introduce the n-stage game, the X-discounted game and the infinitely repeated game; then we prove several properties conceming the sets of feasible payoffs and of Nash equilibrium payoffs.
1. NotatitHK and preUmiiuiries. Let (7, be an A^-person game in normal form with finite pure strategy sets 7^, / e N and payoff function X from r= nf-i^i i°to R'^. We denote by ^/ the set of mixed strategies of player /. We associate to G, a repeated game with perfect recall played as follows: at each stage m, knowing the previous history h^ (i.e. the sequence of moves of all players up to stage m -I), each player / chooses a move {, in Tj and this choice is told to all players.
We denote by S, (resp. S,) the set of pure (resp. mixed) strategies of player i in this repeated game and S = nf-i' S' ,> 2 = flf-1^/-^^ ^°^ define 3 games according to the following payoffs:
(V«) • Sm-1^«. " e TV for G^ {n-stage repeated game), • Sm-i(l -^)"'" ' J^m. ^ e (0,1] for Gx (X-discounted game), ((1/") • Sm-i^^m) for ^00 (i^infinitely repeated game), where x^ is the payoff at stage m and L a Banach limit. ' Let us now define D, {resp. D^, D^) to be the set of feasible payoffs using mixed strategies and £" (resp. E^,E^) to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in G^ (resp.
SYLVAIN SORIN
Note that G, and G^ are_special cases of games G:(.^,S,,/, / G N) where SJ are compact strategy spaces, 2, regular probabilities on S, and / continuous (real) functions on 5 = Ilf-i'^i-^^^ (vector) payoff function is defined on 2 = 11^-12, by It follows that D" and Z)^ will share all the properties of D (set of feasible payoffs in G) and similarly for E" and E^ with respect to E (set of equilibrium payoffs in G).
In particular we have:
(1) D is a nonempty, path-connected, compact set, (2) £ is a nonempty compact set (Nash theorem). Recall that D is usually not convex and E not connected.
Let F he the finite set of feasible payoffs in pure strategies in G, and let C = co F denote the convex huU of F. Hence C is the set of payoffs achievable by using correlated strategies in G,.
Finally define a, to be the individually rational level of player / and A to be the set of individually rational payoffs in C, namely: > a, = min maxA'^rT', f,) V/, where ^' = II ^y 1 • Then the following asymptotic properties hold: (3) D" (resp. D^) converges in the Hausdorff topology as n goes to oo (resp. as X goes to 0) to C and D^ equals C (see [2] , [6] and Proposition 4 below).
(4) £x converges in the Hausdorff topolo©f, as X goes to 0, to A (see [2] or Lemma 2 below)^ and £" equals A (Folk theorem see [1] or [6] ). It is well known that E" does not necessarily converge to A, see e.g. example in §3.
Thus Property (4) shows an important difference with zero-sum two-person repeated games; in this framework the asymptotic behaviour of €" (value of G") and v^ (value of Gx) is the same, even for stochastic games (where it converges to t;^ (value of G^), see [4] and [8] ) or for a large class of games with incomplete information (where Vg^ niay not exist, see [9] ).
2. Study of G" and Gx-We first recall and prove briefly easy results. LEMMA 
(5)
FCD,CD, (6) Dec, Now each payoff in D is the expectation of barycenters of (random) points in F, hence lies in C (6) .
Finally since the extreme points of C lie in F, (5) and (6) imply (7) . The first inclusion in (8) is proved like in (S). The second follows from the fact that at each stage m, conditionally to the history h", each player can obtain an individually rational payoff. • LEMMA 2. £x converges in the Hausdoiff topology to A, as \ goes to 0.Â condition is nwded, see added in proof. A condition is needed, see added in proof.
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PROOF. By (8) it is enough to prove that in any neighbourhood of a point from A lies a point from £x, for X small enough.
Let X in A and assume first x, -a, > c > 0, V/' = 1,..., ^. Then we can write X = S*-!'*"*-"^* *'ith X* in F, a^ in [0,1] and S**** ~ '• Hence there exist n^ in N such that, if S*"* ~ ^ ^"'l S/t(''*/^)-"^* ~ y> ^^ have: /, > a, + e/2 and |/, -X;^! < £/2, Vi.
Choose now X such that (1 -X)* ' > 1 -c/4. It follows then that by playing «, times a move inducing X], . . ., n^ times a move inducing x* and so on and starting again at stage R + \, the payoff in Gx will be some z with: |x, -z,| < e and z, > a, + e/4, for X < X.
We now claim that this payoff can be obtained by equilibrium strategies for X small enough. In fact since the strategies described above are pure any deviation can be observed and the deviator's payoff reduced to a,.
Defining by L the greatest absolute value of the payoffs it follows that the gain by deviating is at most: 2L(1 -(1 -X)*"^') -(e/4Xl -X)*"^' which is negative for X small enough. This ends the proof if A is full dimensional.
If now, for some /, x, = a,, for all x in A, player / will always play a best reply and no profitable deviation for him is profitable. It is then enough to specify the strategies of the other players and the proof goes by induction.
• Note that contrary to the "Perfect Folk Theorem" (see [2] ) the previous result does not extend to perfect equilibria, for a counterexample see [5] .
For any set X and any / in iV we define: tX = {tx; xGX}, t*X={y,y = '2'^,iX^,x^eX}. (9) . Now if o(0) is an equilibrium strategy in G, and similarly for a{j) in G^, j = I,.. . ,m, then the strategy a defined above is still an equilibrium in G^ hence (10) .
I

In particular this gives
Nevertheless there are games for which: (11) the sequences £>" and £" are not monotonic. EXAMPLE 1. G, is a 2-person game defined by the following payoff matrix: Note that (i,|)«1(1,0) -I-1(0,1) belongs to £2 hence to 2)2-Obviously (|,^) is not Now since this pay<rff is Pareto Optimal, the only way to achieve it in G3 is to play a pure strawy at each sta^. This gives the payoffs (n/3,1 -n/3), n •= 0,1,2,3 and (|,^) e? D3. Siaee £, C /), (11) follows.
Note in this example that !)" # C for all n. Remark abo that by duplicating one Strategy of one of the players, D, and £, will not change, but D2 will increase and {\,\) will belong to Dy. Moreover the variations of D" and £" are not related: In this game D^=' C hence Z)] = Z)n for all n. £, is reduced to (2,2) since each player has a strictly dominating strategy. Now we claim that (1,1) belongs to £2.
In fact this payoff is achievable through the following equilibrium strategies: Since by playing first Bottom player I can achieve at most (n -IX"! + l)/n in G^, the fact that he can guarantee m by playing always t(^ implies by induction that £" is reduced to (m + I,m + 1) for all n < m. Now it is easy to see that (m,m) beionp to £^^., (pky (0,0) once then (m + I,m + I), see Sample 2). As for the game Gx we have, as in (11): (16) the nets D^ and £x are not monotonic. EXAMPLE 1 (revisited). By playing once (1,0) and then always (0,1), ihe players achieve (7/8,1/8) in Ey/^.
It is clear tbat this payoff is not in Z),. To prove that it does not belong to D^/^ note that since it is Pareto optimal it can only be achieved by using pure stratepes. The payoff for player I in G3/4 is at most \ d X^'" (0,1) heace Xi has to be (1,0). Now if "2 »= (1,0) player I get at least J| and at most ^ U X2'* (0,1). We shall now focus 00 the sets of feasible ^ycrffs and study prcqierties d convexity and stationarity.
For small values of X the description of I>x u easy ance we have the (compare with (3) andexampk 1 where D^^C Vn): 
{IS) If D^ is convex then D"+J = D^, hence D^ = Cfor all m > n.
PROOF. Let X in Z)« be induced by an A^-tuple of strategies a and let x", OT = 1,.. ., « be the corresponding expected payoff at stage m. It follows that nx 21m-iXm with X, in Z), and x" in C for all m.
21m im , , " Nowj = (Sm>i^m)/(« -1) Still belongs to the convex set C which equals D" by (7) . By (5) this implies that the line segment [x,,/] lies in D" hence: z = x,//i^ + (1 -1/n^)/ belongs to D" and is induced by some T.
Since we have x = (x, + nz)/{n + 1) it follows that x is achievable in G"+^ by playing a at the first stage and then T.
• Reciprocally the following obviously holds: (19) Z)« = D" for all m > n implies £)" = C (by (3) or (9)). PROOF. Let x in D^ be induced by some a and denote by x" the expected payoff at stage m. Here also x, is in Z), and x" is in C with x = X2m=i(l -^T~^x^. Define^ to be X2m>2(l -^)'"~^x^, then7 belongs to C = Z)x and x = Xx, -(-(1 -X)>' .
Z>| being included in the convex set Z)x it follows that x' defined to be ((X -5)/(l -5))x, + ((1 -X)/(l -S))y belongs to Z)x and x = 5x, + (1 -8) We now consider the feasible payoffs lying on L and prove that if this set is decreasing then it contains all L. For N = 2, this property has interesting consequences (see Corollary 12). Let X he induced by a. Since X lies on a face of C, at each stage the random payoff induced by a will belong to this face. Hence it is enough to consider the first component of the payoff.
Let H be the set of histories at stage 2, having positive probability/;(/t), under 0. For each h in H, let a{h) be the strategy from stage 2 on defined by a conditionally on h.
Denote by x, the expected payoff at stage 1 and by X2(A) the payoff induced in Gg by a{h), for each h in H. Thus: If Z is achievable by T in G^, then the following strategy: play a, unless the history at sta^ 2 is /ig and from this stage on use T, gives a payoff w with:
hen
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Note that 0<w-x<( l-8)2d; thus W='(w,O, . .
. ,0) belongs to Dg D {X, Y) contradicting (*).
(b) Since we can do the same construction starting from Y it remains to consider the case where: x = 8x,-(-(1-5), / = «/,.
We now use the fact that DgH L is included in Z)x n L, hence x can be written as X«| + (1 -X)M2 with C/| = («,, 0,. . ., 0) in Z),. Since U2 is less than one and 8 < X we have M| > X|. Hence: ( §) 5M, < XM, < X, ( § §) 6H, + (1 -8) > X. Let us consider the following set: yl = {5M, + (1 -5)/; 7 = (r,0,. .., 0) is in DgD L}. By (**), ( §) and ( § §) it follows that there exists z ia A satisfying: 0<z-x<(l-5) 2d. Now if z is 5«, + (1 -5)/, let I/, be induced by a (in G,) and T he induced by T (in Gg).
The strategy defined by playing 0 at stage 1 and T from stage 2 on gives as a payoff in Gj, Z = (z,0,..., 0) contradicting (•).
• As for the feasible payoffs in the finitely repeated game G" we have:
The proof goes by induction on the dimension of the faces of C and follows obviously from the following: PROPOSITION 9. (
26) Let P be a face of C of dimension p {p < N). If n > pm and D"^" n P C D" D
PROOF. By induction (the proof follows from (5) if/> = 0) we assume that each face of P of dimension at most /> -1 is in D^^.^ and we write D^ for Z>^ D P, for all m.
Note that by (9) we can and shall assume m < n. Suppose tiiat P is not included in 'n+m-Fo"" ^ch point Z in P, rf(Z)^enotes its distance to the compact D'"^" and the maximum, rf > 0, is taken at some_Z._ _ Let B = B{Z,d) n P where B{Z,d) is the closed ball in /?^ with center Z and radius d.
We first need the following: Using Caratheodory's^eorem we can now introduce •Y*in5 n D^+^,k= I,..., q, q <, p + I, such that Z lies in the convex hull of the AT*, and this family is minimal with respect to this property. If A^* is generated by 0* in Gn^.^, let us denote by 5* the average expected payoff up to stage m and for each history in Hi^: set of histories at stage m + 1 having positive probability p{h) under 0*, let U {h) he the average expected payoff for the remaining n stages in G"^", conditionally on h. Thus: (n + m)A'* = mS* + n^ p{h) U''{h).
(**)
Since -Y* belongs to the face P, S* and U''{h) have the same property, (a Let L be the linear ^ace ^nerated by th^A^* and denote by |2 ^ projection on L of the points T in R" satisfying: <r,Ar* -~Zy> a'' for all k. Note that Q contains the projection of P on L and that Q is homeom(»phic to a simplex of dimension
We shall write T for the projection of T on L and introduce barycentric coordinates  (a',..., a'' ) for the points in Q such that the set of a's with a* >» 0 carre^jonds to the set of f in e with <f. A"* -Z> » a*. Let (a',. .., 5*) COTT^xmding to 1. It follows from (**) and (•••) that 5* < m/{m + n) for all fc = 1,. .., ^. Since '^^'^ = 1, this inequality implies pm > n contradicting the assumption.
• In order to obtain more precise results for A^ = 2 we shall prove and use the following property (recall that D is the set of feasible payoffs in a game G): Defining y by T\t;a,T\-Y\f,a',f'\ we obviously have: Ind(/,y) =5^0. The idea of the proof now is to introduce a new path y*, such that Ind(/, y) = Ind(j, y*), with the additional property that y* will be the image under A" of a path in the strategy's space. The latter being simply connected (in fact contractile) this will imply Ind(j,y*) = 0, hence the contradiction.
Recall that y is defined by:
We define y* by adding to y from the point y{t) the closed path p If JV-2, 0<5<X, Z)aCZ)x im^ies Dg = C, m>% D^^^dD, implies D"^" = C.
PROOF. Using (23) Dg contains the frontier of C hence is equal to C by (27). The proof is similar for D".^" by using (26) with /> = 1, then (9) to reduce to the case w < n, and finally (27).
• Open problem: is D simply connected or even contractile for N >21
3. Simiy <rf the prfaoner's dileflma. In this part we shall study the following two-person game: We first remark that D^^^ C hence Z)n = C for all n and that A = {x = (x,,X2) | x E C, X, > 1, / = 1,2). Moreover £, == { (1,1) ) since B and R are strictly dominating strategies in G,.
This game has been widely analyzed and it is well known that E" -{(1,1)}, see e.g. [7, pp. 95-102] . Nevertheless this property is not a consequence of the existence of strictly dominating strategies (see Example 4) and backwards induction arguments lead only to perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs.
A more general class of games for which an analog property holds is described by the following result:(recall that a, PROPOSITION 13. Let G, be an N-person game such that £, = {a} then En=^ [a) for alln.
PROOF. Let 0 be a Nash equilibrium iV-tuple of strategies in G^ corresponding to a payoff different from a. Denote by H^{a) the set of histories up to stage m having a positive probability under 0.
Obviously, since a is the tmly one-stage Nash equilibrium payoff, the payoff induced by 0 at stage n conditionally to any history in ^^^(0) is a. Hence there exists a stage m and an history h^ in H^{a) such that: -the payoff induced by 0 at stage m conditionally to h^ is different from a, -the payoff at any further stage k> m + \ conditionally to any h,^ that follows hâ nd belongs to Hi^{a) is a.
In particular this implies that 0 is not in equilibria at stage m, conditionally to h^; hence we can assume that player 1 can strictly increase his payoff at that stage by using some T,. Now, by definition of a,, whatever being 0', player 1 can obtain at least a, for the remaining stages, which was his payoff under 0.
It follows that by deviating at stage m if A^, player can strictly increase his average payoff; since h^ belongs to H^{a) we obtain a contradiction. I Note that this condition is also necessary since a recent result states that for N = 2, £, ^ {a} implies that E" converges to A (see [3] ).
We now turn to the study of die discounted game. The following result was already announced in [2] . PROPOSITION 14. £x is reduced to {(1,1)} for all X in (J, I].
PROOF. Let (0,T) be an equilibrium pair in G^. !!" will denote the set of histories up to stage n and H* those histories in H^ having positive probability under (0tT). We write «" for the random payt^ of player I at stage n, and s"(h") (reap. t^{hj) for the probability of playing T {r&sp. L) at stage n, conditionally onh",a and T.
The equilibrium condition can be written as follows: For each h" in H* and each 0' whi<^ ccHncides with 0 up to stage n -1:
(and simil^ly for player II). (2) One can also prove that the analog of Proposition 15 holds, at least for fi > max{l + a, 1 +2x}.
(3) To compute £;i^ for other values of the discount factor seems quite difficult. It is nevertheless easy to see that £;^ is not monotonic: there are denumbrably many points on the Pareto boundary for 1/2 < X < 3/4.
(4) We use deeply the fact that the "gain of deviating" was uniform, namely x. In the more general case:
p-y,P-y P,a-X a-X, P a, a with p-y> a x>Q, y>0
the critical value is X = max{ p-a-x, p-ay}/iP -a). In fact if / > X an alternate sequence (p,a -x),ia -x, P),... gives an equilibrium at X; and simUarly if x >y a. stationary sequence of (p -y, P -y) is an equilibrium. Now if for some X > X, (a, T) is an equlibrium, it keeps this property as x OT y decrease, in particular for x'= y'= tmn{x, y) contradicting Remark 1. The explicit computation of B^ seems more delicate.
Added in proof. Lemma 2 holds under the following additional assumption: A is full dimensional or iV = 2, as used in the proof. Forges, Mertens and Neyman have a counterexample where ^ = 3 and A is 2-dimensional.
